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Abstract — The paper presents Deep Hiding Techniques 
(DHTs) that define general techniques that can be applied to 
every network steganography method to improve its 
undetectability and make steganogram extraction harder to 
perform. We define five groups of techniques that can make 
steganogram less susceptible to detection and extraction. For 
each of the presented group, examples of the usage are 
provided based on existing network steganography methods. 
To authors’ best knowledge presented approach is the first 
attempt in the state of the art to systematically describe general 
solutions that can make steganographic communication more 
hidden and steganogram extraction harder to perform. 
Keywords: deep hiding techniques, information hiding, network 
steganography, multi-level steganography, inter-protocol 
steganography 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
All of the information hiding techniques that may be used 
to exchange secret data (steganograms) in 
telecommunication networks are called network 
steganography. The term was originally introduced by 
Szczypiorski in 2003 [1]. To perform hidden communication 
network steganography utilizes as a carrier for steganograms 
network protocols and/or relationships between them [2]. It 
must be emphasized that for the third party observer who is 
not aware of the steganographic procedure steganograms 
exchange remains hidden. This is possible because inserting 
hidden data into chosen carrier must remain unnoticeable for 
users not involved into steganographic communication. 
For each network steganography method there is always 
a trade-off necessary between maximizing steganographic 
bandwidth (how much data we are able to send using this 
particular method) and still remaining undetected. However, 
user can utilise a method naively and sends as much secret 
data as is possible but it simultaneously raises a risk of 
disclosure. So he/she must purposely resign from some 
fraction of the steganographic bandwidth in order to achieve 
undetectability. Such user behaviour raises the following 
questions: what else can user do to improve stealth of his/her 
secret communication? Does it all depend on the functioning 
of the particular steganographic method? 
In this paper we introduce Deep Hiding Techniques 
(DHTs) which we define as general techniques that are able 
to make usual network steganography communication even 
more hidden. Thus such method is then harder to detect and 
the steganogram carried is less susceptible to extraction. 
Based on this concept we will show what measures can be 
taken for chosen steganographic method to make it harder to 
detect than without applying DHTs.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Deep Hiding Techniques classification 
 
We define five types of the Deep Hiding Techniques 
(presented classification (Fig. 1) is based on what particular 
DHT affect – a steganogram or a carrier): 
• Steganogram Scattering (SGS) that utilizes 
different techniques which involve distributed 
sending of divided steganogram. 
• Steganogram Hopping (SGH), which is based on 
the periodical change of the steganographic method 
during single hidden connection thus influencing the 
localisation of the steganogram. 
• Carrier Modifications Camouflage (CMC), which 
focuses on masking insertion of the steganogram into 
hidden data carrier. 
• Inter-Protocol Steganography (IPS), which uses 
relationships between two or more different network 
protocols to enable secret communication and make 
it harder to detect. 
• Multi-Level Steganography (MLS), which allows 
to utilize functioning of the existing steganographic 
method (upper-level method), to create another one 
(lower-level method). The lower-level method 
completely relies on upper-level one. 
 
The comparison between DHTs and typical network 
steganography method features is presented in Fig. 2. 
The abovementioned techniques will be presented in 
detail throughout the rest of the paper which is structured as 
follows. Section 2 describes Steganogram Scattering 
techniques. Section 3 provides presentation of the 
Steganogram Hopping. Section 4 discusses Carrier 
Modifications Camouflage approach. Section 5 and 6 
introduces Inter-Protocol and Multi-Level Steganography, 
respectively. Finally, Section 7 concludes our work. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Deep Hiding Techniques vs. typical steganographic 
method features 
II. STEGANOGRAM SCATTERING (SGS) 
A. Description 
The idea of Steganogram Scattering techniques is to split 
steganogram into pieces and send it as separate messages. 
Each part may be transmitted using different steganographic 
method.  
Currently, hidden communication methods are proposed 
that exploit division of the secret message into pieces. One 
of them is Collage [5], a method that hides parts of the 
steganogram in user-generated content on the Internet. 
However, to the best of authors’ knowledge, scattering of 
the steganogram has not yet been considered as general tool 
that can be used with all known network steganography 
methods. We propose following classification of the SGS 
techniques (Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2 Steganogram Scattering (SGS) classification 
 
1) Flows-based scattering 
Flows-based scattering takes advantage of the capability 
to set up many flows between two hosts. Each piece of the 
previously divided steganogram is sent using one of the 
available flows. In this case, flow means the possibility of 
the communication between two hosts, it is not confined to 
connection-oriented protocols (e.g. TCP) and flow can also 
be created using connectionless protocols (e.g. UDP). An 
idea of using many flows for purpose of network 
steganography method was introduced in Cloak method [6], 
but it was exploited as a mean to create new covert channel 
and limited only to TCP protocol. 
An example of the flows-based SGS technique is 
presented in Fig. 3. User X wants to send hidden message to 
User Y. Sender decides to split steganogram into three 
pieces and use three flows: two TCP connections on port 80 
(HTTP sessions with two pages of the website) and UDP 
communication on port 123 (NTP synchronization). Each 
part of the secret message is then sent using different flows 
and possibly different steganographic methods. User Y 
receives three separate chunks and combines them into 
original steganogram. 
Presented example does not consider steganogram 
assembly process. However, it is important to determine 
order of the merging received fragments. For that purpose 
several possibilities can be utilized. The most naive one is to 
add information about a position in steganogram to each 
fragment. Another way is to make a position of the fragment 
in original steganogram depended on the time of sending. 
Consider two fragments – the one which sending was 
started earlier occupies position before another. For 
example, if a steganogram is divided into three parts and the 
first bit of fragment 3 is sent at 00:00:00, the first bit of the 
fragment 2 is sent at 00:00:01 and the first bit of the 
fragment 1 is sent at 00:00:02, it means that the first piece of 
the steganogram is fragment 3, the second one is fragment 2 
and the third one is fragment 1. In other words, message can 
be correctly assembled if the order of the pieces in 
combined steganogram is: fragment 3, fragment 2 and 
fragment 1. It is worth noting that this method requires 
synchronization between sender and receiver. It is also 
possible to number flows and assign pieces of the 
steganogram to flows beforehand. 
 
Fig. 3 Flow-based Steganogram Scattering (SGS) 
 
2) Hosts-based scattering 
Hosts-based scattering requires that a sender and/or 
receiver is controlling more than one physical host or other 
networking device. Pieces of the steganogram are hidden in 
different hosts-based overt channels (overt channels 
between two hosts). Two hosts-based overt channels are 
different if they have different senders, different receiver or 
both. The example of the hosts-based SGS is presented in 
Fig. 4. User X (n hosts) wants to send secret message to 
User Y (m hosts). Sender splits steganogram into k parts and 
sends them using steganographic methods that are available 
in different hosts-based overt channels. User Y receives k 
pieces of the steganogram and merges them. 
In the presented example maximum number of parts (k) 
into which steganogram is divided, equals a number of the 
different host-based overt channels – n·m. However, user 
may not want to use some hosts for hidden communication. 
Besides, it is worth noting that sender and receiver of the 
steganogram do not have to have physical access to his/her 
hosts. He/she can use single computer to manage other 
hosts. 
 
3) Flows and hosts-based scattering 
Hybrid SGS techniques utilize both hosts- and flows-
based scattering. It means that there can be more than one 
flow between each pair of the sender and receiver hosts. It 
causes significant increase in number of available flows. 
It is worth noting that not every flow must be used for 
steganographic purposes. Moreover, some parts of the 
steganogram can be redundant and can be sent using 
different flows. It increases resilience and the chance of the 
successful steganogram reception, even if some parts are 
lost or removed. 
 
Fig. 4 Host-based Steganogram Scattering (SGS) 
 
B. Examples 
The most obvious application of the Steganogram 
Scattering technique is communication between two users 
who want to transmit secret information between them. 
There are many possible ways to apply different network 
steganography methods to achieve this goal. For example, 
users can use VoIP conversation as an overt channel and 
thus utilise e.g. LACK method [8] or one user can download 
file from another and use few TCP specific methods. 
Moreover, nowadays, it is common that ordinary users 
possess more than one computer device. It is also possible 
for users to have more than one Internet connection from 
different ISPs. For example, one access from cable modem 
ISP and another one using public wireless networks. Thus, 
we may divide steganogram into pieces and scatter them 
along different devices or steganographic method in a 
predetermined way. All of the abovementioned facts make 
SGS technique available for everyone, who wants to send 
hidden data. 
III. STEGANOGRAM HOPPING (SGH) 
Steganogram Hopping techniques utilize periodical 
change of the steganographic method during single hidden 
connection (Fig. 5). This causes the steganogram localisation 
change thus making it harder to detect and extract. SGH 
techniques concept is similar to SGS. However, the main 
difference is that SGH utilizes single connection and single 
steganogram fragment transferring in a given moment of 
time, while SGS experiences no such constraints.  
For example, if as a hidden data carrier SCTP connection 
will be chosen then the following three methods can be used 
for steganogram transfer [9]: 
• Multi-homing based steganographic method that assigns 
certain steganogram bits sequence for each sender and 
receiver IP address. Then, depending on a hidden data 
bits to be transferred, consecutive retransmitted SCTP 
chunks are sent to the proper IP addresses.  
• Multi-streaming based steganographic method that 
assigns certain steganogram bits sequence for each SCTP 
stream used. Hidden communication is then performed 
by sending consecutive SCTP chunks to the proper SCTP 
streams. 
• Steganographic method that utilises the number of the 
SCTP chunks in SCTP packet as a hidden data carrier. 
 
Fig. 5 Steganogram Hopping concept 
 
Detection of the abovementioned methods requires 
statistical analysis of the SCTP connection features but for 
every method the analysis must be carried out differently. 
Analysis should be focused on communication distribution 
across different IP addresses or streams or on the number of 
the chunks in SCTP packet respectively.  
Applying SGH techniques and using these three methods 
during single overt SCTP connection causes detection of the 
hidden communication and steganogram extraction to be 
more difficult. To discover secret data transfer, SCTP 
connection must be analysed in more details when compared 
to single SCTP steganographic method scenario. 
 
IV. CARRIER MODIFICATIONS CAMOUFLAGE (CMC) 
DHT techniques that belong to Carrier Modifications 
Camouflage group are all solutions, sometimes simple, 
which main aim is to mask existence of the steganogram 
inside the carrier. This may be achieved using a wide 
spectrum of actions. Examples of the CMC techniques 
include: 
• Intentional reduction of the steganographic bandwidth – 
steganogram is inserted into the carrier less frequently, 
thus less secret data is sent and a chance of detection is 
decreased. It is the simplest way of the steganogram 
insertion camouflage and can be utilized for every 
steganographic method.  
• Adjusting the way steganographic method works during 
steganograms exchange – some methods allow to 
influence their behaviour while transmitting 
steganograms to minimize the chance of disclosure. For 
example in Cloak method [6] one can change its 
parameters: number of packets N and TCP flows X 
during steganographic communication which makes 
detection harder to perform. 
• Adjusting steganographic method behaviour to typical 
users/services traffic patterns – traffic generated by 
network steganography method should fit into typical 
traffic patterns that are present in the network and are 
generated by user/services etc. It involves adjusting 
sending of the steganograms to specific times of the day, 
particular frequency of the traffic generation etc. For 
example, previously mentioned LACK method [8] 
utilizes IP telephony calls to send steganograms. That is 
why, usage of this method should depend on the 
frequency, length and time of the day of the calls 
performed in particular network etc. 
• Utilization of the traffic characteristic features to 
camouflage hidden communication – for certain 
steganographic methods it is possible to utilize traffic 
features like anomalies, level of the network parameters 
like number of lost packets etc. or other events to mask 
steganographic exchange. For example, RSTEG 
(Retransmission Steganography) [7] enables hidden 
communication by not acknowledging a successfully 
received packet in order to intentionally invoke 
retransmission. The retransmitted packet carries a 
steganogram instead of user data in the payload field. For 
RSTEG it is vital to observe network TCP 
retransmissions level and adjust intentional 
retransmissions to ones observed in the network. Another 
example is PadSteg (Padding Steganography) method [3] 
that to carry steganogram takes advantage of non-zeros 
frame padding that is result of the ambiguous 
standardisation. Existence of such unexpected anomaly 
masks PadSteg functioning. 
V. INTER-PROTOCOL STEGANOGRAPHY (IPS) 
Typical network steganography method uses 
modification of a single network protocol. The protocol 
modification may be applied to the PDU (Protocol Data 
Unit), time relations between exchanged PDUs, or both 
(hybrid methods). This kind of network steganography is 
called intra-protocol steganography. The concept of the 
inter-protocol steganography (IPS) was originally 
introduced by Jankowski, Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski in 
[3]. It is defined as usage of the relationships between two 
or more different network protocols to enable secret 
communication. Protocols used by inter-protocol 
steganography can belong to the same layer of the e.g. 
TCP/IP stack or to different ones (Fig. 6). In this approach 
utilization of more than one protocol to enable hidden 
communication provides greater undetectability thus 
limiting the chance of disclosure. That is why one may state 
that IPS hides better what has already been hidden.  
The first example of the inter-protocol steganography 
was introduced in [3] where authors proposed new 
steganographic system PadSteg (Padding Steganography). It 
benefits from utilizing relationships between Ethernet (IEEE 
802.3), ARP, TCP and other protocols.  
 
Fig. 6 Intra- and Inter-protocol steganography comparison 
 
PadSteg enables secret communication in a hidden group 
in a LAN environment. In such group, each host willing to 
exchange steganograms should be able to locate and identify 
other hidden hosts. To provide this functionality in PadSteg, 
ARP protocol together with improper Ethernet frame 
padding are used. To exchange steganograms, improper 
Ethernet frame padding is utilized which is a result of using 
upper layer protocols like TCP, UDP, ARP or ICMP (or 
other network protocols that cause Ethernet frames to be 
padded). These protocols are called carrier-protocols as they 
enable transfer of the steganograms throughout the network. 
In other words, steganogram is inserted into Ethernet frame 
padding but one must always "look" at the other layer 
protocol (e.g. ARP, TCP, ICMP or UDP) to determine 
whether it contains secret data or not. 
Moreover, while the secret communication takes place, 
hidden nodes can switch between carrier-protocols to 
minimize the risk of disclosure. Such mechanism is called 
carrier-protocol hopping (Fig. 7). 
 
 
Fig. 7 Intra- and Inter-protocol steganography comparison 
 
So how inter-protocol steganography can be used for 
typical steganographic method that utilizes single network 
protocol to make it more hidden? One should look for 
relationships between particular protocol that this method is 
based on and other protocols that cooperate with it. And 
then use this relationship to make steganographic 
communication harder to detect. For example, in PadSteg 
short frame padding is utilized which can be used as a 
standalone steganographic method, but by adding carrier-
protocol hopping mechanism detection is encumbered.  
VI. MULTI-LEVEL STEGANOGRAPHY (MLS) 
Multi-Level Steganography is a new concept of 
information hiding in telecommunication networks that was 
introduced to network steganography by Frączek, 
Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski in [10]. It uses features of an 
existing steganographic method (the upper-level method) to 
create a new one (the lower-level method) MLS idea is 
presented in Fig. 8.  
 
Fig. 8 Steganographic bandwidth relationship between overt 
traffic and upper- and lower-level method in MLS 
 
MLS is based on at least two steganographic methods. 
First, the upper-level method uses overt traffic as a secret 
data carrier. The second, the lower-level method, uses the 
way the upper-level method operates as a carrier. The 
indirect carriers for lower-level methods are still packets 
from overt communication, but the direct carrier is another 
(upper-level) method 
Creation of different-levels steganographic methods has 
two important features. Firstly, the bandwidth of the lower-
level method is usually a fracture of bandwidth of the upper-
level method. It is similar to relationship of overt 
communication bandwidth and upper-level steganography 
bandwidth. Secondly, the lower-level steganography is 
harder to detect than upper-level steganography. It results 
from fact that the lower-level method entirely depends on 
upper-level one and adversary has to detect upper-level 
method before he/she starts to seek for lower-level one. This 
is one of the reasons why MLS is a deep hiding technique. 
There are also other applications of MLS that allow making 
hidden more hidden [10], e.g. changing parameters of 
upper-level method.  
Potentially, each known steganographic method can be 
used as upper-level method. The main problem is to find 
suitable lower-level method that will cooperate with the 
upper-level one. If we consider hybrid methods like LACK 
[8], RSTEG [7] or SCTP hybrid method [9] as upper-level 
method, then the lower-level method can hide bits in 
number of packets with steganogram of upper-level method 
send in established time periods. For example, if packet with 
steganogram of SCTP hybrid method is sent during one 
second period – it means binary “1”, else – it means binary 
“0”. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we introduced Deep Hiding Techniques 
that are defined as general techniques that can be applied to 
typical network steganography method to improve its 
undetectability and make steganogram extraction harder to 
perform. To authors’ best knowledge presented approach is 
the first attempt in the state of the art to systematically 
describe solutions that can make steganographic 
communication and steganogram itself harder to detect. 
Knowledge of such techniques is vital when designing and 
developing steganalysis tools and devices. Thus, future 
work will be focused on analysis of each DHTs group and 
proposing potential detection methods.  
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